Upcoming Talks and Conferences
March 2017: Banks, Systemic Risk, Measurement and Mitigation (Rome)
Upcoming in 2017: Universitat Pompeu Fabra, KU Leuven, Banque-de-France, FIRS
Current Academic and Non-Academic Appointments
Professor of Finance (W3), Chair of Financial Markets, University of Mannheim - Business School, Since January 2016
Head of the Research Group "International Finance and Financial Management" at the Center of European Economic Research (ZEW), Since January 2016
Research Fellow Center for Financial Studies (CFS), Since 2013
Forschungsprofessor ("Professor of Research"), IWH - Halle Institute of Economic Research, 2014 - 2017
Member of the Schmalenbach-Arbeitskreis „Strategieentwicklung und Controlling in Banken“, Since 2015
Academic Advisory Board "Frankfurt Institute for Risk Management and Regulation (FIRM)", Since 2016
Curriculum Vitae (February 2017)
News - Academic Research
"Syndication, Interconnectedness and Systemic Risk", with Jian Cai, Frederik Eidam and Anthony Saunders, resubmitted to the Review of Finance, 2017.
Paper Online Appendix
Syndication increases the overlap of bank loan portfolios and makes them more vulnerable to contagious effects. We develop a novel measure of bank interconnectedness using syndicated corporate loan portfolios, overlap based on industry and region, and different weights such as equal weights, size and relationships. Interconnectedness is driven mainly by bank diversification, less by bank size or overall loan market size. We find that interconnectedness is positively correlated with different bank-level systemic risk measures including SRISK, DIP and CoVaR, and such a positive correlation mainly arises from an elevated effect of interconnectedness on systemic risk during recessions.
"Mind the Gap: The Difference between US and European Loan Rates", with Tobias Berg, Anthony Saunders and Daniel Streitz, 2016, Review of Financial Studies, forthcoming.
We analyze pricing differences between U.S. and European syndicated loans over the 1992-2014 period. We explicitly distinguish credit lines from term loans. For credit lines, U.S. borrowers pay significantly higher spreads, but lower fees, resulting in similar total costs of borrowing in both markets. Credit line usage is more cyclical in the U.S., which provides a rationale for the pricing structure difference. For term loans, we analyze the channels of the cross-country loan price differential and document the importance of: the composition of term loan borrowers and the loan supply by institutional investors and foreign banks.
"The Wolves of Wall Street: Managerial Attributes and Bank Business Models" with J. Hagendorff, A. Saunders, and F. Vallascas,
This Version: November 2016 *** revised version ***
PDF File Slides (coming soon)
Financial Times Coverage Financial Times Podcast
We investigate the role of executive-specific attributes in explaining bank business models beyond pay-per-performance incentives. We decompose the variation in business models and show that idiosyncratic manager-specific effects (or ‘styles’) of members of a bank’s top management team are reflected in key bank policy choices. Manager styles far outrank executive compensation and other observable manager variables in terms of their ability to describe variation in bank business models. Bank manager styles also explain differences in risk and performance across banks, including cross-sectional variation in bank risk during the global financial crisis. Finally, we combine manager styles from various bank policies to derive manager profiles that are associated with managers’ personal risk preferences, board characteristics and whether or not managers will be appointed as CEO during their careers.
"Does Lack of Financial Stability Impair the Transmission of Monetary Policy?" with V. Acharya, B. Imbierowicz, and D. Teichmann, November 2015 * being revised for resubmission to the Journal of Financial Economics.
PDF Version Slides Online Appendix
We investigate the transmission of central bank liquidity to bank deposit and loan spreads in Europe over the January 2006 to June 2010 period. We find evidence consistent with an impaired transmission channel due to bank risk. Central bank liquidity does not translate into lower loan spreads for high-risk banks, even as it lowers deposit rates for both high-risk and low-risk banks. This adversely affects the balance sheets of borrowers of high-risk banks, leading to lower payouts, lower capital expenditures, and lower asset growth. These firms replace term loans drawing down existing credit lines. Our results suggest that during a banking crisis, the transmission of central bank liquidity to the real sector may be more effective if accompanied by a strengthening of banking sector health.