Upcoming Talks and Conferences
Upcoming in 2017: Lunch Debate "Brexit" (Brussels), University of Zurich, Banque-de-France,
Upcoming in 2018: AFA, AEA, IBEFA
Follow me on twitter: @sascha_steffen
Current Academic and Non-Academic Appointments
Professor of Finance, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, Since August 2017
Research Fellow Center for Financial Studies (CFS), Since 2013
Forschungsprofessor ("Professor of Research"), IWH - Halle Institute of Economic Research, 2014 - 2017
Member of the Schmalenbach-Arbeitskreis „Strategieentwicklung und Controlling in Banken“, Since 2015
Academic Advisory Board "Frankfurt Institute for Risk Management and Regulation (FIRM)", Since 2016
Associate Editor, Journal of Banking and Finance, Since 2017
Curriculum Vitae (September 2017)
News
- I am participating in a Lunch Debate discussing the implications of Brexit on financial markets on Sept. 27th in Brussels. Please find the program here including registration information.
- The paper "Do Corporate Depositors Risk Everything for Nothing? The Importance of Deposit Relationships, Interest Rates and Bank Risk", with Daniel Friedmann, Bjoern Imbierowicz and Anthony Saunders, has been accepted for presentation at the AFA 2018 meetings.
News - Academic Research
"Does the Lack of Financial Stability Impair the Transmission of Monetary Policy?" with V. Acharya, B. Imbierowicz, and D. Teichmann, September 2017 * resubmitted to the Journal of Financial Economics.
We investigate the transmission of central bank liquidity to bank deposits and loan spreads in Europe over the January 2006 to June 2010 period. We find evidence consistent with an impaired transmission channel due to bank risk. Central bank liquidity does not translate into lower loan spreads for high-risk banks, even as it lowers deposit rates for both high-risk and low-risk banks. This adversely affects the balance sheets of high-risk bank borrowers, leading to lower payouts, lower capital expenditures, and lower employment. Overall, our results suggest that banks’ capital constraints at the time of an easing of monetary policy pose a challenge to the effectiveness of the bank lending channel and the effectiveness of the central bank as a lender of last resort.
"Cutting Out the Middleman – The ECB as Corporate Bond Investor" with Benjamin Grosse-Rueschkamp and Daniel Streitz
The European Central Bank’s Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP), launched in June 2016, increased the supply of capital for eligible Eurozone firms through direct corporate bond purchases. Using a difference-in-difference framework, we document a shift in the composition of credit from loan to bond financing for eligible (i.e., investment-grade rated) firms. High quality investment-grade rated firms increase acquisitions, while BBB rated firms increase cash holdings and capital expenditures. Banks with a high share of investment-grade rated firms increase lending particularly to private but not public firms after the announcement of the CSPP. Our results suggest that the CSPP has positive spillovers to firms that do not have access to bond financing and reduces financial constraints particularly of GIIPS firms with positive effects on the real sector.
"The Zero Risk Fallacy - Banks' Sovereign Exposure and Sovereign Risk Spillovers", with Karolin Kirschenmann and Josef Korte, New version, August 2017.
European banks are exposed to a substantial amount of risky sovereign debt. The “missing bank capital” resulting from the zero-risk weight exemption for European banks for European sovereign debt amplifies the co-movement between sovereign CDS spreads and facilitates cross-border financial-crisis spillovers. Risks spill over from risky periphery sovereigns to safer core countries, but not in the opposite direction nor for exposures to countries not exempted from risk-weighting. We consider the trade-off of benefits of sovereign debt (for banks and sovereigns) and spillover risk when applying risk-weights. More bank capital as well as positive risk-weighting for sovereign exposures mitigates spillovers.
"Lender of Last Resort versus Buyer of Last Resort - Evidence from the European Sovereign Debt Crisis" with Viral V. Acharya and D. Pierret, August 2017. *** Revised Version ***
We document channels of monetary policy transmission to banks following two significant interventions of the European Central Bank (ECB) during the sovereign debt crisis. As a lender of last resort via the long-term refinancing operations (LTROs), the ECB improved the collateral value of short-term sovereign bonds of peripheral countries. Banks in the peripheral countries became excessively dependent on public funds and increased their exposure to domestic debt. An elevated concentration of peripheral sovereign bonds in the portfolios of risky banks increased fire sale risk, increasing the riskiness of both banks and sovereign bonds. In contrast, the ECB’s announcement of being a potential buyer of last resort via the Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) program attracted new investors to the sovereign bond market, reduced concentration and fire sale risk, and permanently improved solvency conditions for eurozone banks.
